Why did the EU fail to promote democracy during the Arab Spring?INTRODUCTIONSince its creation, the European Union has been trying to spread its model of liberal economics and democracy to their neighboring countries. The Middle East region has always been of vital importance for Europe due to migration, security and energy. We need to take into consideration that the Middle Eastern countries have a geographical proximity to Europe, therefore the young unemployed (due to nationalization in the 50’s and ISI programs), became the main sources of legal and illegal migration in EU countries. This migration became a security issue due to the economic crisis, unemployment, rise of populist parties in some European countries and spread of the radical political Islam inside European Muslim communities. Therefore, in order to improve the Arab countries’ situation, the EU tried to promote a reform through the “rule of law, an accountable government, freedom of expression and assembly and respect for human rights” (Hollis, 2012). During the Arab Spring, people in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen and Syria, came out to the streets asking for freedom, dignity and justice. These revolts demonstrated that EU’s policies failed to work in Middle Eastern countries. While, since 1995 the EU tried to promote policies for a ‘shared prosperity’ and a decrease in unemployment in the Middle East, the reality was far from achieving this. Arab revolts in 2010-2011 were triggered due to authoritarian regimes, persistent and gross disparities in wealth and a high unemployment. Moreover, regarding human rights actions, Europe proved to favor regimes and practices that were intolerable to the majority of Arab society.PARTNERSHIPS &AGREEMENTSTounderstand how EU policies failed to promote shared prosperity and a decreaseof unemployment, we need to analyze at least the 3 main policy instruments theUnion promoted before the Arab uprisings. EMPTheEuropean Union made its first attempt for a coordinated action with MiddleEastern countries in 1995 when they signeda partnership with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria,Lebanon, Turkey and, the Palestinian Authority named the Barcelona Declarationwhich launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The goal of this partnershipwas to promote “regional stability through economic integration anddemocratization in a multilateral forum, including Israel” (Cavatorta &Rivetti, 2014). The EMP had three pillars, the “political and securitycooperation to establish a common area of peace and stability”; “an economicand financial partnership to create an area of shared prosperity (including afree trade area)”; and “the enhancement of social and cultural ties, to develophuman resources, promote understanding between cultures and facilitateinteraction at the level of civil society” (Hollis, 2012). The EMP partnership was created due to the Algerian failedliberalization and civil war in the 90s “which made EU policy-makers aware ofthe challenges emerging from instability” (Cavatorta, 2009). Moreover, accordingto Cavatorta and Rivetti (2014) “the peace process between Israel and thePalestinians induced the EU to promote multilateralism to bring about broaderregional peace.”Nevertheless, the partnership proved to be unequal, the Union createdthe path for the Mediterranean partner countries to follow, respondingbilaterally. Moreover, the Mediterranean partner countries’ future economicgrowth depended on Europe since they had more to sell to the Union than to anyother country due to geographical proximity. Also, the creation of a shared prosperity and free trade area (to comeinto full effect by 2010) demonstrated that it privileged more the Union morethan its partners. While the Union removed tariff and non-tariff barriers totrade in manufactured goods to enjoy a more rapid procedure, they alsoliberalized trade in agricultural products, one of the main exports of northAfrican states, but it would be a slower procedure. While this seemed as astrategy from the Union to increase development inside Europe, theMediterranean partner countries saw how their gap between standards of livingwidened. Moreover, economic growth policies under the EMP were based on“efficiency measures that actually cut jobs as opposed to generating them”(Hollis, 2012). Some commentators even thought that rather than looking afterthe Mediterranean partner’s needs, the partnership was an instrument for theUnion to stop the flow of migrants from Arab countries to Europe by throwingmoney at the problem.Political and security cooperation to establish a common area of peaceand stability had not been met. Regarding regional security, there was a clearArab resistance to cooperate with Israel due to their denial to end theiroccupation of the Palestinian occupied territories, the Golan Heights of Syriaand the Sheba Farms claimed by Lebanon.The promotion of an economic and financial partnership to create an areaof shared prosperity and a free trade area was the only measurable impact.According to Hollis (2012) only some few economic reforms from the EMP hadbenefited ordinary people in the Arab Mediterranean partner countries.Regarding the “enhancement of social and cultural ties, to develop humanresources, promote understanding between cultures and facilitate interaction atthe level of civil society”, only some cultural dialogue and civil societycontacts had gone forward but with “limited results” (Hollis, 2012).ENPAfter 9/11, the European Union decided to launch in 2003-2004 a newinstrument to deal with 16 of their Mediterranean partners, the EuropeanNeighborhood Policy (ENP). The Union was realizing that middle easterneconomies and political systems were very diverse and therefore, required adifferent approach. Moreover, while the US developed a 2004 Arab reform, theUnion developed the ENP as a parallel initiative to promote “good governance,economic stability, democracy and human rights.” The ENP became the mainvehicle for EU funds to Arab Mediterranean countries as long as they met theAction Plan conditions of government and economic reform and other issuesaffecting the country’s development. “The implementation of specific measuresfor migration control is among the conditions to be met by the MPCs in order toreceive more EU-financial assistance.”There was no warm response in the Arab World since Arab autocrats were against losing power in the name of democracy but, some Arab governments went along since the Union’s market was too important to them and the ENP gave them more access and aid. However, the ENP only opened privileged access to the EU market and cooperation on scientific research to Israel. As Hollis (2012) pointed out, Egyptians “could not make a choice of theshortlist of ‘Action Plans’” and therefore, appealed to hard bargaining and inthe process, “avoided accepting any internal political and judicial reformsthey did not want”. On the other hand, Jordanians view the ENP as a chance toget “financial and technical assistance for introducing measures that would sitwell with their own reform plan. Nevertheless, they weren’t capable ofimplementing all the measures of the Action plan.  Lebanon was also happy to sign since thegovernment thought that having the Union on their side could strengthen theircountry towards their domestic rivals and Syrian interference.However, the ENP Action plans did not succeed. The Union failed tounderstand that the laws and regulations promoted were a core value for the EUbut might not necessarily make sense outside the union. UFMRecognizing the failure of the EMP, the EU re-launched the Barcelonaprocess cooperation as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008. The UfM promotedeconomic integration through a “set of commercial projects” where Europeans andNorth Africans would work together on “economy, energy, infrastructure,transport and environment” areas. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,Palestine, Syria (suspended), Tunisia and Turkey, among other non-Arab statesfrom Eastern Europe, signed the new Union (European Commission, 2016). Toelevate the partnership to an intergovernmental level, the UfM created a jointpresidency among an EU and an Arab head of state working together with a newsecretariat located in Spain. The first joint presidents, Sarkozy and Mubarak,worked to promote “more bureaucracy, attendant new costs and a focus onstate-to-state diplomacy rather than business or civil society engagement.” Nevertheless,according to Hollis (2012) in 2011 the “UfM was dying”.Summing up, the political and societal efforts of the EMP, ENP and UfM forpromoting free and fair elections, pluralism, democracy, respect for the humanrights or tolerance to religious, ethnic and other minorities wereunsuccessful. Regarding the economic level of market economy and free trade,the three policy instruments had mixed results, many countries had economicsuccess and high economic growth but their poverty population widespread too (Brtnick, 2011).Thetrade liberalization promoted through the EMP, ENP and UfM, had several costsand benefits. Despite the domestic opposition to this liberalization, EU pushedthis measures to be implemented and could have favored that the MediterraneanArab partners governments to became more authoritarian. Only the elite befittedfrom these reforms and the EU adopted a soft approach towards authoritarian oilproducers like Algeria because their economies rely on hydrocarbons of some Arabregions. All of these factors somehow led to the Arab uprisings. Regardingsecurity issues, Europe saw the Arab area as a security problem rather than an opportunity,Islamism, terrorism and migration were top issues of the political, securityand societal levels of the foreign policy. The partnership main focus was toaddress the rise of Islamism as a destabilizing factor, the arms proliferationand Iran’s nuclear program and the Arab Israeli conflict. According to Brtnick(2011) “EU involved into its civil society and democratization programmed onlythat kind of persons and political forces who spoke a language that the Unionwanted to hear. They ignored the Islamic civil society organized aroundmosques, Islamic societies and charities and Islamist Parties”.EU’s attempts to promote democracy and human right in the Middle East did fail since authoritarianism is still somehow enduring in some of the regions. This failure was due to a poor policy coordination, contradictions in policies’ design, mistaken assumptions of their norms and the ability of middle eastern regimes to resist external pressure since the “EU ultimately preferred authoritarian stability to democratic messiness” (Cavatorta & Rivetti, 2014). There were “repeated delays and failure to fulfill obligations” due to “increasing cooperation and dependence on authoritarian regimes: rulers like Egyptian Hosni Mubarak, Tunisian Zen Din Ben Ali or even Libyan Muammar Qaddafi were perceived as important partners.” (Brtnick, 2011)POST ARAB SPRINGThe Arab Spring revolts were not inspired by western countries, theywere addressing domestic problems such as authoritarian regimes that repressedopposing ethnic groups, abuse of power, corruption, a huge unemployment,poverty and humiliation. Arabs were looking for solutions and a change ofpower. Nevertheless, this revolts had a huge impact on the internationalcommunity. Following their previous failed attempts, the EU reacted with two maindocuments. First of all, as an initial response to the uprisings in Tunisia andEgypt the EU launched “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity withthe Southern Mediterranean”.  On theother side, since the ENP was dying by 2011, the EU also launched “A NewResponse to a Changing Neighborhood” modifying the ENP to the new realities theregion was facing (Brtnick, 2011). Finally, the EU would also promote acommunication based on the “Support for Partnership, Reforms and InclusiveGrowth”.The EU policies implemented once the Arab uprisings began, were to becoordinated by the European External Action Service (EEAS), responsible for “policyformulation and programming activities”, and the European Commission,responsible for the “implementation of programs and payments of funds”. EU’s first attempt for “A Partnership for Democracy and SharedProsperity with the Southern Mediterranean”,controlled by the European EEAS and the Commission, offered an “incentive-basedapproach” (Bicchi, 2014) based on implementing more reforms that would be repaidwith more cooperation and greater EU support for those complying countries inthe Middle East. Those that committed to the reforms, were offered a “mobilitypartnership” (Bicchi, 2014) that would give them an “ease to legal migration”and would increase the funds and “market access” destined to the countrythrough the negotiation of “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas” and a “Regulatoryconvergence” (Bicchi, 2014). Additionally, the ENPwas “promoting legislative and regulatory approximation towards higherstandards in all relevant areas and in particular to encourage the progressiveparticipation of partner countries in the internal market” (Bicchi, 2014). Onthe other hand, the EU created a new program on the ENPI budgetary line, the ‘Supportfor Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth’ (SPRING) to support “democratictransitions, economic growth and institution building”.Nevertheless, the new ENP, had the same principles applied and fewerfunds disbursed against a worsening socio-economic situation. According toBichhi (2014), this was because the uprisings caught the European Union in themiddle of a huge economic crisis that “shook political and social foundationsof domestic systems”. The outcome from the Arab uprising policies would bedetermined by this economic crisis in Europe that would dedicate fewer time tothe neighboring region and had limited capacities to find results due to theuncertain future of the region and therefore, had limited capacities to createa “coherent political and economic response”.Figure 1 – ENP Commitments & PaymentsWhile the EU seemed to be implementing newpolicies to approach the Arab uprisings and promote their democratic model,specifically by incrementing EU’s funds’ commitments, the truth was that theactual payments of these commitments severely declined year by year. First of all, the EU seemed to have a “time lap”among the programmed budget (a general indication of how much the EU wouldspend), their commitment (the budget committed for each country and for theirdifferent priorities), and the actual payments (the transferred funds from theEU to the country). For example, for the Financial Protocols signed in the 90’sthe EU had the actual payments completed by 2010.  This could mean that the EU could take morethan 10 years to actually pay all of their commitments. Moreover, according toBicchi (2014) the “the more difficult the task, the more likely the EU is tounder-spend”. The author sets an example about how the European Initiative forDemocracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in the Mediterranean countries underspent a25% of their 3.7 million commitments in the early years of the program(2001-2005) for their promotion of democracy and human rights. They “neverreached the ground and were lost as the budgetary deadlines were missed”(Bicchi, 2014). Nevertheless, in Figure 1, we can appreciatethat the funds committed increased a 50% from 2011 to 2012. The ENP commitmentsremained pretty high until 2015 when they decided to decline the commitments inorder to “absorb the budget cuts” (Bicchi, 2014). However, the funds actuallypaid decreased once the Arab spring began, from 2009 to 2013 there were morethan 1,3 billion committed that were not spent. In 2014, the EU declared thatit would take about 4 years to clear the last payments committed in 2013 and in2015, they decided to cut spendings. 2014 resulted to be a low year for the Unionsince there were new programs and procedures waiting to be implemented. Figure 3 – SPRING COMMITMENTSMoreover, SPRING commitments were under the ENPbudget lines instead of creating new and separate ones. While SPRING looked tosupport “democratic transformation, institution building and sustainable andinclusive growth and economic development” they faced limitations in theirabsorbing capacity too due to EU’s reluctance to pay the funds. Therefore, the2013 commitments resulted more restrictive than previous ones. Moreover, while thefunds’ destination was clear, it was difficult to know if they were actuallyspent and on what (Bicchi, 2014). CONCLUSIONAs seenabove, the EU did have a role in triggering the Arab revolts but notintentionally. Rather than exporting their main values of freedom, democracyand rule of law, the Union’s policies towards the region betrayed them. Theyhave proved to prioritize their own prosperity and stability at expenses of theArab world’s own prosperity and stability. As stated above, the creation of afree trade area privileged more the EU than the Arab countries since, while theremoval of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade manufactured goods (whichbenefited the EU) proceeded rapidly, the liberalization of trade in agriculturalproducts (main export of North Africa) proceeded slowly. Moreover, only Israelbenefited from the ENP with an open access to the EU market and cooperation onscientific research. Economicliberalization did not have the desired outcomes since the reforms inauthoritarian regimes triggered the rise of social conflicts across the Arabcountries. Only the elite benefited from the reforms and fewer conditions andpenalties for non-compliance were applied to authoritarian oil producers due tothe EU’s reliance on hydrocarbons and authoritarian rulers like Mubarak, BenAli or Kaddafi that were perceived as important partners. EU’s prosperity goaltowards the region also failed since the gaping between living standardswidened rather than diminished. On theother hand, political and societal policies were also unsuccessful since EU didnot achieve their implementation of “free and fair elections, pluralism,democracy, respect of human rights or tolerance to religious, ethnic and otherminorities” in the region. An example of it could be el-Sisi in Egypt and hislatest elections in 2018 where he won with a 97% of the votes while he arrestedor forced to drop anyone who tried to run against him for presidency (heactually put a pro-Sisi candidate to run against him so he did not get 100% ofthe votes).The EU’srole in the Arab uprisings was limited and shook the Arab world. As seenpreviously, there was a strong disconnection among the initial discourse fordevelopments of their new approaches and the actual policy implementation whichhas shown a lack of vision towards the Arab countries and a decrease of theirfinancial commitments.When theArab spring stroke, instead of giving more privileges to the most complyingcountries the EU gave the same or less than they were giving before the uprisingsbegan.  While the Arab countries had moreeconomic needs following the revolts due to production stoppage and damage ofphysical properties (for example, in Tunisia the uprisings cost about 1,6billions), the Union decreased their payments. Moreover, Europe has not beenable to innovate their main policies addressed to the region, they applied thesame principles with fewer funds paid facing a worst socio-economic situation. It is clear that the EU promised more than itcould deliver. The political chaos that the Arab spring countries weresuffering led to an uncertainty and shrinking absorption capacity for the fundsexpected to work over a medium to long period. Meaning that, when the EU facedthis political chaos, they were more reluctant to apply processes and were moreunlikely to deliver funds in the short term since the political priorities ofthe regions could shift very quickly and therefore, made it difficult for theEU to plan their activities. On the other hand, the increase of funds led to anincrease of conditionality for the payments, meaning that, the initialconditions for the funds had not been met and therefore, the EU had no optionbut not to spend and made it difficult to know when and where the conditionscould be met. In conclusion, the EU failed to promotedemocracy and its core values towards the Middle East because, before the Arab uprisingsthey looked for their own benefits and to privilege those important partnersthey relied on despite if they were authoritarian or not leading to awidespread of poverty where only the elite benefited. Moreover, the EU did notlook at each country individually, they approached the Middle East as a wholeand they should have taken into consideration that each case was different,i.e. Tunisia and Egypt had very different outcomes from the uprisings. Insteadof promoting democracy and supporting or sanctioning those regimes that did notcomply to their reforms promoting their core values, they committed to paymentsthey could not fulfil and maintained the same policies when the region waschanging and facing a worse socio-economic situation than before the uprisingswhen the Union was privileging those important for them. REFERENCESEUR-Lex. (2011). 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No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis of the ‘Arab Spring’. International Affairs, 88(1), 81-94.Cavatorta, F. (2009). The international dimension of the failed Algerian transition: Democracy betrayed?. Oxford University Press.European Comission. (2016). Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Retrieved June 22, 2018, from https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/union-mediterranean-ufm/329/union-mediterranean-ufm_enGet Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more