The “ASEAN Way”A Critical Assessment of the Role of ASEAN inConflict Management in Southeast AsiaIntroductionThe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been at the forefront of managing conflicts in Southeast Asia (SEA) since its creation in 1967. For fifty years, it has maintained peace and security in the region, and has been touted as the most successful inter-governmental organization in this respect.[1] However, the role played by ASEAN and the nature of its contribution to conflict management in SEA remains widely debated. ASEAN is criticised for having a weak mandate, and for not playing a decisive role in managing conflicts between its member-states.[2]Some pundits claim that ASEAN has contributed toconflict avoidance, but has failed to resolve actual conflicts.[3] Thefailure to directly address and ultimately resolve conflicts between itsmember-states undermines ASEAN’s credibility as a regional body with conflictmanagement responsibilities. On the other hand, several reputable observers havenoted that ASEAN is not intended to formally act as a third-party mediator unlessit is requested to do so by member-states.[4]Rather, the Association is intended to serve as a vehicle to promote better relationsamong its members.[5]In light of such contending perspectives, this essayargues that a common and accurate understanding of ASEAN’s actual and potentialrole in conflict management can be achieved through an examination of theorganisation’s mandate and mechanisms. This paper will clarify the role playedby ASEAN and provide an objective assessment of ASEAN’s performance in conflictmanagement. The essay begins with an examination of key ASEANdocuments which provide foundational authority and guidance for theestablishment of mechanisms for conflict management. This is followed by acritical discussion of the theory behind the creation of ASEAN and an analysisof how the Association has utilised available mechanisms in managing conflictsin the region. The analysis will be informed and illustrated by examples of bilateraldisputes in SEA where ASEAN has played a role in conflict management. The paperwill conclude with a summary of pertinent findings and a brief assessment ofthe implications of the study.ASEAN Conflict Management: Mandate and MechanismsASEAN’s mandate and mechanisms for conflict managementare drawn from seven key ASEAN documents.[6] Anexamination of these documents will clarify what ASEAN does and could do interms of conflict management in the region.The ASEAN DeclarationTheASEANDeclaration was adopted on 08 August 1967.[7]Otherwise known as the Bangkok Declaration, it outlines the aims and purposesthat the regional cooperation intends to achieve, as well as processes andmechanisms that shall be established to carry out these objectives. The ASEAN Declarationestablishes ASEAN as an Association for regional cooperation among thecountries of Southeast Asia. Cooperation is aimed at the “economic, social,cultural, technical, educational and other fields, and in the promotion ofregional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice, rule of lawand adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter”.[8]The reference to ASEAN’s approach to conflict managementwas broadly highlighted in the Association’s desire to “establish a firmfoundation for common action to promote regional cooperation that contributestowards peace, progress and prosperity in the region”.[9] Inessence, the document lays the foundation of the role ASEAN plays in managingconflicts between its member-states in SEA.The Declaration of ASEAN ConcordThe so-called “formative years” from 1967 to 1976 led tothe signing of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord on 24 February 1976 at Bali,Indonesia.[10]In pursuit of political stability, the ‘ASEANConcord’ contains general principles and programme of action for ASEANmember-states to adopt as a framework for cooperation and improvement of ASEAN mechanismsfor conflict management.Notably, the dominant principles advocated in thisdocument are the exclusive reliance on peaceful processes in the settlement ofintra-regional differences; mutual respect and benefit, self-determination;sovereign equality; and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.[11] Inaddition, the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)is also pursued.[12]These formative years saw the development of a more vigilant ASEAN,particularly in its approach to regional peace and security.The Treaty of Amity and CooperationTheTreaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was also adopted in Bali in February1976.[13]Signed by the Heads of States of ASEAN’s founding members,[14] TACprovides guidelines on conflict management, particularly the “pacificsettlement of disputes” between its members.[15] TACoutlines fundamental principles that guide relations between the signatories,including: non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;peaceful settlement of disputes; and the renunciation of the threat or use offorce. [16]Adherenceto these critical considerations was evident in TAC Chapter 4, Article 13, ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’, which stipulatesthat signatory member-states: “[S]hall have the determination and good faith toprevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affectingthem should arise, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shallat all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendlynegotiations”.[17] Thisbasically determines how member-states should behave in situations wheredisputes may arise or have risen between them.In addition to settling disputes through regionalprocesses, the TAC provides for the creation of a ‘High Council’,[18]composed of representatives at the ministerial level with the role of taking“cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturbregional peace and harmony”.[19] Further,Article 15 of TAC designates the ‘HighCouncil’ authority to recommend among disputing parties settlement of disputesthrough (e.g. UN) mediation, inquiry or conciliation.[20]However, upon agreement of the parties in dispute, the ‘High Council’ can in itself “constitute into a committee ofmediation, inquiry or conciliation” [21]and resolve the conflict at the regional level.Salient to the aforementioned articles of TAC areprescribed limitations on the role of the ‘HighCouncil’ in dispute settlement. Article 16 emphasizes that Articles 14 and15 cannot be applied unless parties to the dispute agree to their application.[22] Explicitlystated, mediation can only be employed in a dispute if parties to the disputeagree to bring the matter to the ‘HighCouncil’ for settlement. In effect, this provision significantly constrainsASEAN’s conduct of conflict management between its member-states. As timeprogressed, further policies were adopted by ASEAN, which saw its role in theregion continue to evolve.The Rules of Procedure of the High CouncilOn July 2001, during the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meetingin Hanoi, member-states adopted the Rules of Procedure of the High Council ofthe TAC in Southeast Asia.[23]The Rules of Procedure consist of ten parts covering twenty-five ‘Rules’ that apply to the ‘High Council’ and to any of its working groupsin pursuance of its conflict management role.These Rules of Procedure prescribe the ‘High Council’ composition and designationof the Chairperson; initiation of dispute settlement procedures; convening of proceedingsat the meetings of the ‘High Council’;decision-making; as well as procedures for making amendments to the ‘Rules’.[24] Notableamong the procedures is a recurring thematic emphasis on expressed written communicationsby parties in dispute when invoking the dispute settlement procedure. Ofcrucial importance is the written confirmation and “agreement on theprocedures” from disputing parties by the Chairperson before the disputesettlement process can proceed.[25] Moreover,all decisions made at or by the ‘High Council’shall be through consensus and any amendment to these ‘Rules’ shall be unanimously agreed by all the signatorymember-states.[26]The Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, adopted in October2003 during the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, demonstrates ASEAN’s commitment to collaborationand development within its member-states.[27]The ‘Bali Concord II’ reaffirms the Association’sresolve in pursuing fundamental values and principles enshrined in itsdeclarations, treaties and other key documents since 1967. The document reaffirmsthe importance of adhering to the principles of non-interference and consensusin ASEAN cooperation and reiterates that TAC is an effective code of conductfor relations among governments.[28]ASEAN’s commitment in upholding cultural diversity andsocial harmony is evidenced by the ten ‘Declarations’made in this second ‘Concord’. Directreference to the significant role of ASEAN in conflict management is made inDeclaration 4, which resolves “to settle long-standing disputes throughpeaceful means.[29]Declaration 5 similarly promotes TAC as “a diplomatic instrument for thepromotion of peace and stability in the region”.[30]Aside from endorsing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the primary means toenhance political and security cooperation in the wider ASIA-Pacific, newframeworks were adopted to achieve a more “dynamic, cohesive, resilient andintegrated ASEAN community”.[31]To attain these overarching goals, the Associationadopted frameworks for an ASEAN Security Community (ASC); an ASEAN EconomicCommunity (AEC); and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).[32]Most relevant, however, to ASEAN’s role in conflict management is the creationof the ASC. The ASC framework clearly establishes ASEAN’s commitment to the UNCharter and adherence to international law, aside from reiterating thepromotion of the well-established principles of ASEAN.[33]It is also interesting to note that to be forwardlooking, ASEAN will “explore innovative ways to increaseits security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, whichinclude, inter alia, the followingelements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflictresolution, and post-conflict peace-building”.[34] The‘Bali Concord II’ clearly indicatesthat ASEAN is determined to play a decisive role in managing conflicts in theregion.The ASEAN Security Community Plan of ActionIn late November 2004, during the 10th ASEAN Summit atVientiane, Laos, the Association adopted the ASEAN Security Community Plan ofAction (ASCPA). ASCPA is underpinned by the “principle of comprehensivesecurity” and seeks to operate on “shared norms and rules ofgood conduct in inter-state relations; effective conflict prevention andresolution mechanisms; and post-conflict peace building activities”.[35]It should be clarified, however, that ASCPA promotes an ASEAN-wide politicaland security cooperation, and not a defence pact, military alliance or jointforeign policy.[36]ASCPA processes are guided by ASEAN’s fundamental principles as outlined in1967, which serves as a strong foundation of ASEAN cooperation.[37]In particular, ASCPA displays a high degree ofcontinuity and adherence to principles of inter-state collaboration while strengtheningframeworks for conflict management in SEA. The ‘Plan’, which includes six components, is geared towards creating anenvironment that ensures continued peace, security and stability in the region.[38]The emphasis is on exclusive reliance to peaceful processes in settlingintra-regional differences and disputes. The ‘Plan’ also aims to achieve a standard of common adherence to normsand good conduct among its member-states, strengthening confidence-buildingmeasures, carrying out preventive diplomacy, resolving outstanding regionalissues and enhancing cooperation on non–traditional issues.[39]In addition, the ‘Plan’aims to create conditions for sustainable peace and preventing the re-emergenceof conflicts in affected areas. As part of its role in conflict resolution, ASEANencourages using existing regional dispute settlement mechanisms and processes(e.g. TAC), but does not prohibit member-states to utilize national, bilateraland international mechanisms (e.g. UN). To ensure effective implementation of ASCPA,specific measures are envisaged – such as strengthening of the TAC regime; disputesettlement mechanisms; and the ARF process.[40]The development of an ASEAN Charter is also a priority of the ‘Plan’. It can be surmised that ACSPA, providesa workable framework with which ASEAN can operate to promote and enhance itsrole in managing conflicts between its member-states in SEA.The Charter of ASEANOne of ACSPA’s top priorities, the ASEAN Charter, was adoptedin 2007, and it entered into force on 15 December 2008. The Charter serves as a“firm foundation in building an ASEAN community by providing ‘legal status’ and ‘institutional framework’ for ASEAN”.[41]The ‘Charter’ not only reaffirmswell-established principles and mechanisms advocated in other key ASEANdocuments, but substantially highlights the importance of conflict managementthrough peaceful settlement of disputes.[42]As a testament to ASEAN’s resolve in pursuing peacefulsettlement of disputes, Chapter VIII of the ‘Charter’ was dedicated to this end. Aside from promoting timely dialogues,consultation and negotiation in settling disputes, Article 22 of the ‘Charter’ stipulates that ASEAN shouldmaintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all areas ofcooperation.[43] Disputingmember-states can, likewise, resort to good office; conciliation; or mediation.[44]Compliance with findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from thesemechanisms shall be monitored by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other designatedASEAN body. Needless to say, the ‘Charter’embodies aspirations for an ASEAN community that promotes “common desire andcollective will to live in a region of lasting peace, security and stability”.[45]Essentially, these aspirations prompt ASEAN to play a decisive role in conflictmanagement with the ultimate objective of improving peace and security in SEA.Conflict Management in Southeast AsiaThe creation of ASEAN was primarily the result of resoluteefforts of founding member-states to establish a regional cooperation thatcould provide a viable framework for conflict management.[46]The formation manifested the original member-states’ sincere desire to handleexisting and future disputes through peaceful means, seeking to improve peaceand security in SEA. Thus far, ASEAN has been credited as “one of the mostsuccessful experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world”.[47]At the heart of this claim, is ASEAN’s role in “moderating intra-regionalconflicts” that has not only significantly reduced the likelihood of war, butmaintained peace in the region.[48]International Relations Theories on Regional CooperationThe success of ASEAN in managing disputes in theregion, particularly in the early 1990s,[49]has led regional scholars to question ‘Western’models of regional cooperation that advocate legalistic and formalisticinstitutions.[50] Thesewestern constructs draw on the ‘InternationalRelations Theories’ on ‘Realism’and ‘Liberalism’. ‘Realists’ such as John Hertz, view internationalrelations as a “vicious circle of security and power accumulation as states aredriven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of thepower of  others”.[51]For ‘realists’, survival in an ‘anarchic’ international system cannot beachieved through interdependence, but rather states are inclined to be isolationistin character, which guides their behavior in their relations with other states.[52]‘Liberalism’,on the other hand, particularly ‘neo-liberalism’,accepts the ‘realist’ premiseconcerning “anarchy as a given of the international system and that cooperationamong states, while possible, arises only in response to states pursuing theirshort-term self-interests.” [53]‘Neo-liberalism’ proved influentialin the study of international organizations from late 1970s, as it advocatesinterdependence and international collaboration among states.[54]Interestingly, both ‘neo-liberalists’and ‘neo-realists’ view internationalinstitutions (e.g. ASEAN), as “key agents of peaceful change” that can regulatethe behavior of states – i.e. manage conflicts between states. However, ‘neo-realists’ view ‘change’ as a “consequence of shifts, often violent, in the balanceor distribution of power”.[55]On the other hand, ‘neo-liberalists’posit that change can “occur peacefully through international institutions”.[56]Nonetheless, it has been argued by some scholars, that ‘constructivism’ has been the main theoretical framework for thestudy of regional cooperation in SEA.[57]The theory of ‘constructivism’postulates that international relations is “a process of social learning andidentity formation, driven by transactions, interactions and socializations”.[58]Like ‘realism’ and ‘liberalism’, ‘constructivism’ recognizes the “possibility of change being afundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in the ‘perceptions’ and ‘identifications’ among actors – or states”. Acharya suggests thatsuch processes explains the propensity of states to develop cooperation and “mutualinterdependence”, which encourages states to renounce the use of force insettling disputes between them.[59]‘Constructivism’advocates the idea of a ‘community’ –the sharing of “values, norms and symbols that provide social identity” thatultimately reflects long-term interests, such as peaceful settlement ofdisputes and maintenance of peace and security in the region. Notably, ‘constructivists’ recognize the importanceof norms, particularly their impact in shaping international relations. Normsnot only “regulate state behavior”, but also, redefine state interests as wellas create state and collective identities.[60]ASEAN, as a collection of diverse identities with shared values and norms, isclearly a product of a ‘constructivist’tradition.The ‘ASEAN Way’The ASEAN model for conflict management, otherwise knownas the ‘ASEAN Way’, is a classicmanifestation of ‘constructivism’. Characterizedby “informality and organizational minimalism” in contrast to ‘Western’ constructs’ primacy of legaland formal institutions, the ‘ASEAN Way’of managing disputes is regarded as vital to the success of regionalcooperation in SEA. The ‘ASEAN Way’ ischaracterized by a preference to work outside the parameters of formal orinstitutional frameworks in order to avoid conflict or contain it.[61]In effect, this has led ASEAN to successfully build its own unique mechanismfor dispute settlement.[62]Despite ASEAN’s perceived success, the organization has been widely criticizedas having a weak mandate, ineffective mechanisms, and of not playing a decisiverole in managing disputes between its member-states [63]– an aspect that will now be explored.This essay argues that ASEAN’s success in conflictmanagement can be measured by the role it has played in managing conflictsbetween member-states. Several scholars suggest that ASEAN has been effectivein avoiding conflict, but has failed to resolve conflicts between its member-states.[64]In order to objectively determine the effectiveness of ASEAN in this realm, conceptualclarity is needed. Conflict management is a combination of three elements: Conflictprevention or avoidance, conflict containment and conflict termination (settlementand resolution).[65] Muthiah Alagappa distinguishes‘conflict avoidance’ – as thepractice of not addressing specific disputes for the sake of the largergrouping and regional stability – from ‘conflictresolution’ as the attempt at solving the historical, diplomatic, economicand or military origins of a particular conflict.[66]Research suggests ASEAN has been successful in managing conflicts, particularlybetween the original member-states.[67]This does not, however, mean all conflicts were resolved or did not occur.ASEAN’seffectiveness in managing conflicts through ‘conflict avoidance’ was exemplified during the expansion of ASEANin the 1990s. The addition of new member-states ushered in new challenges, ofteninvolving border disputes – e.g. between Thailand and Cambodia (Preah VihearTemple Dispute), the sovereignty disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia over PulauSipadan and Pulau Ligitan or the Philippines and Malaysia (Over Sabah Island).[68]The majority of these cases were peacefully settled bilaterally or throughdialogue with other member-states.Bilateralefforts were managed and facilitated by mechanisms established by ASEAN, inparticular the TAC and the ASEAN Charter.[69]This also highlights the role of ASEAN as a facilitator rather than athird-party mediator in the disputes. However, some member-states preferredinternational arbitration (e.g. Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca/PulauBatu Puteh) at the International Court of Justice when bilateral negotiationsfailed or were unable to deliver amicable solutions.[70]If success in conflict management is examined from the perspective of preventionor avoiding member-states’ use of military might, then ASEAN can be regarded as“impressive”, in as much as no border or sovereignty dispute has resulted in a shooting-warsince regional cooperation was established.[71]The ‘ASEAN Way’ of peacefully managing existingand potential disputes among member-states has indeed achieved peace, stabilityand security in the region. However, even with such commendableaccomplishments, ASEAN was criticised of “sweeping the conflicts under thecarpet” rather than resolving them.[72]Some scholars claim that these failings illustrate the limitations of ASEAN’s ‘institutional framework’ in conflictmanagement.[73]RalfEmmers claims that ASEAN fails to resolve conflicts because of the ‘residual mistrust’ between themember-states.[74] Froma ‘constructivist’ perspective, heclarifies that ‘trust’ is “a beliefthat the other side is trustworthy, and that is willing to reciprocatecooperation”.[75] ‘Mistrust’, on the other hand, is a “beliefthat the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one’s cooperation”.[76]This ‘mistrust’ has roots in deep-seateddomestic and regional circumstances. Prevalence of strategic competition,national identities and patriotic nationalism, suspicion and historicalanimosities are among those cited.[77]Domestic interests which are driven largely by politics rather than domesticinstitutions and bureaucracies are also offered as an explanation.[78]Emmers argued that this ‘mistrust’between the member-states essentially restricts ASEAN’s ability to addressconflicts in SEA.Risingabove these ‘mistrusts’ will remove thisstumbling block which undermines ASEAN’s ability to resolve conflicts. It will enableASEAN to progress from conflict avoidance to conflict resolution. Cultivating ‘trust’ between member-states can bechallenging, but not impossible. ASEAN has in fact started to create conditionsfor increased interaction through overall cooperation of member-states underthe “ASEAN-umbrella”.[79]This is evidenced by increased conduct of ASEAN summits (twice a year), regularconsultations and dialogues, and regional military training exercises, amongothers. Itshould be noted that the Association’s creation was primarily rooted in thedesire to promote better relations among its member-states. More importantly,ASEAN can only formally act as a third-party mediator, and only has the mandateto resolve conflicts if member-states voluntarily subscribe to its mechanismsfor conflict management. Therefore ASEAN’s effectiveness in conflict managementis considerably enhanced if member-states actively utilize these regionalmechanisms. Until then, ASEAN conflict management will only be successful interms of conflict avoidance and prevention rather than conflict resolution.ConclusionThisessay examined key ASEAN documents to provide an understanding of what ASEANcan and cannot do in managing conflicts between its member-states. An analysisof pertinent documents reveals that ASEAN is putting considerable effort intopromoting peaceful settlement of disputes among its members. ASEAN’s approachwas to adopt fundamental principles which create readily available mechanisms forconflict management for member-states. The ‘ASEANWay’ of managing conflicts is underpinned by well-established principles ofrespect for national sovereignty, non-interference inthe internal affairs of a member-state, peaceful settlement of disputes and renunciationof the threat or use of force.ASEAN’s institutional framework in conflict managementis inherently characterised by a preference to work outside formal orinstitutional models in order to avoid or contain conflict. This led ASEAN to buildits unique mechanisms for dispute management. The ‘ASEAN Way’ manifests ‘constructivism’through ‘constructivist’ traditionsthat promotes shared norms, values, and collective identities. This explainsASEAN’s predisposition to develop cooperation and mutual interdependence which renouncesthe use of force in settling disputes.ASEAN, thus far, can be considered successful,particularly in its role in regional conflict avoidance or conflict prevention.On the other hand, it can only effectively act to resolve conflicts ifmember-states voluntarily subscribe to ASEAN’s prescribed mechanisms. Bilateraldisputes among member-states in the region have considerably benefited fromthese processes, but have mostly fallen short of formal resolution. ‘Mistrust’between member-states is cited as an enduring factor that undermines ASEAN’scapacity for successful conflict management. Overcoming this challenge shouldbe ASEAN’s top priority, if it is determined to act decisively and maximize itsfull potential in managing conflicts in the region. 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Crisis States Working Papers 2:33 (March 2008). athttp://www.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/research/crisisstates/download/wp/wpseries2/wp332.pdf,[Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].[1] Melly Caballero-Anthony,“Mechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience”. ContemporarySoutheast Asia 20:1 (April 1998), 39.[2] Ramses Amer, “The Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Conflict Management Approach Revisited;Will the Charter Reinforce ASEAN’s role?”, Austrian Journal of South-EastAsian Studies 2:2 (2009), athttp://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-362807. [Accessedon 01 Jun 2017], 7.[3] Ibid, 76.[4] Ibid, 24.[5] Ibid.[6] ASEAN Key Documents: TheASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration); The Declaration of ASEAN Concord;Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; The R