The effectiveness of any formand role of military intervention to the threats posed by transnationalterrorism is contingent upon the degree of adaptability to the dynamic andinterdisciplinary nature of these phenomena. This paper analyzes the role of themilitary in deterrence doctrines, the struggles in defining terrorism andthreats, the options available to counter such threats, types of militaryinterventions, the public perception along the risk of over-militarization, andultimately the UK perspective. The framework for the analysis is based on thedifferences between the principles of counter-terrorismand the principle of war in relation to the successful integration of amilitary element in counterterrorism initiatives.[1] The effectiveness of a militaryresponse is measured as a function of the socio-political implications to thepopulation affected and the impact on terrorists’ activities. This workadvocates that a military response is only useful and effective whenoperationally implemented rather than constituting a war model. Among theorists and students of terrorism Professor Yonah Alexander, Director of International Center for Terrorism Studies, remarked on the effectiveness of a military response to terrorism’s threats.[2] There is consensus on the emergence of the era of “New Terrorism” and the proliferation of the former terms that certainly contributes to a prolonged confusion over the conceptual and doctrinal roles of the military in combating current and future challenges on all geographical levels.[3] From the study of contemporary international politics emerges the empirical challenge of conceptualizing “terrorism”.[4] A definitive and widely agreed upon definition of the concept has proven elusive for many years.[5] It could be argued that there is an epistemological limitation of the term arising from differences in morphology of the hierarchies, actors, structures, ideologies, beliefs, identities, modus operandi, and areas of influences. Furthermore, epistemological limitations to the use of history as a learning tool greatly influence the process of establishing the effectiveness of a military response to terrorism-related threats.[6] However, a historical perspective provides evidence that this phenomenon is nothing new (e.g. terror at war during the Roman Empire).[7] The war model has proven to be the favourable model of response in some instances (e.g. August 1969 Northern Ireland riots);[8] however, the effectiveness of the war model should be assessed in quantitative terms. The ability of terrorists to operate covertly all over the world, the asymmetrical nature of their operations and the absence of quantifiable assets affects the ability to measure the success or failure of a military intervention. Moreover, the principle of proportionality should also be observed by the foreign policy responding to those threats.[9]    Global terrorism poses one of the most immediate and asymmetric threats to security, stability and prosperity of the world population.[10] Threats of terrorism have taken many forms in recent times, and the level of intensity is ever changing. Acts of terrorism are mostly characterized by the use of some degree of violence, violating human rights, affecting individuals and/or institutions, sought to achieve political objectives with serious social, political and economic implications. [11] An historical analysis reveals that terrorism threats are shaping administration’s foreign policies. Recent events call for a global defence network based on a multipronged strategy through a combined effort of the criminal justice system, global financial system and the private sector in conjunction with a multilateral tactical implementation of military power; military operations not wars.[12]It should also be consideredthe axiomatic relationship between terrorism and globalization, taking intoaccount the evolution of transnational terrorist threats into a globalphenomenon. Counter-terrorism (CT) refers to the tactics and techniques used bygovernments and other groups to prevent and minimize terrorist threats. [13] Literature is broadlyavailable describing several doctrines aiming at justifying and supportingmilitary interventions; especially following the historical landmark of the9/11 attacks, the War on Terror, 7/7 in London, the rise of ISIL and recentsuccessful terrorist attacks within the western world. In the long-term,government’s CT ability to understand and address the root causes of terrorismwill also depend on the inherited abilityto collect, analyze, and carry out collective activities aimed at shaping theenvironments from which terrorists and their networks emerge.[14] Pedahzur and Ranstorpremarked on the strategic nature of available counterterrorism’s frameworks.They describe three plausible options: the “criminaljustice model” where counterterrorism remains under the jurisdiction of lawenforcement agencies; the “hybrid model?heightened criminal justice model in which military personnel providespecialized support to law enforcement agencies; and the “war model? when the military assumes overall responsibility forcounterterrorism.[15]It could be argued that theeffectiveness of a military response is a function of the intrinsic advantagesand disadvantages of the implementation of a war model. The conflicts in formerYugoslavia, the Chechen conflict with Russia, Iraq, Afghanistan in 2001-2, andthe ongoing fight against ISIL are clear examples of wars involving terrorism.Key features of the conflicts are attacks on civilians, a gross violation of human rights, polarization,long duration, intense violence, long-term involvement of UN and otherIGOs/NGOs.[16]  Despite diversities in the origin of theseconflicts, a military intervention has proven to be not only effective but alsonecessary in order to restore peace and security.[17] In assessing the type ofmilitary intervention, Gus Martin classifies military actions into two:suppression and covert operations. Suppression involves military attackstargeted against areas affiliated with terrorists and their infrastructures.Furthermore, it entails the use of “military or paramilitary assets to punish,destabilise, or destroy terrorist and their supporters”[18]  Examples of suppression campaigns include the2002-3 Israeli organised Operation Defensive Shield and the 2001-2 Afghanistanwar; an all-out war waged against armed non-state actors. Therefore, militaryand paramilitary strikes could be in response to terrorist aggression (punitivestrikes) or expectancy of terrorist aggression (pre-emptive strikes).[19] Covert operations involvesecretive operations that include the destabilisation and sabotage of suspectedterrorist infrastructures as well as kidnapping and assassinations ofindividual terrorists.[20] Examples of covertoperations are: the Israeli unit known asWrath of God tracking and assassinating Black September terrorist after the 1972Olympic massacre;[21] and the US drones strikesthat killed members of Taliban, Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan between2004 and middle of 2011.[22] The advent of the “War onTerror” created a plethora of debate on the strategicuse of military power and its usefulness.[23] Although, It should alsobe considered that according to Ersen and Ozen military forces are successfully employed in the war against terrorismbecause it meets the public and media demand for tough action against thesponsors and perpetrators of terrorism.[24] Further use of terrorismand its sponsorship is discouraged as the military inflicts heavy costs onterrorists and their sponsors. Potential attackers and state sponsors all overthe world are alerted against the use or support of terrorism. The war model offersthe possibility of providing a psychologically damaging setback to the enemyleadership. This, in turn, might undermine enemy leaders and hasten theirremoval from power. They also argue that military action discourages terroristbacking and inflicts destruction on terrorists and their sponsors.[25] In order to set up ayardstick for a representative measurement of military effectiveness in July2008, the RAND Corporation published a study “How Terrorist Groups End”.[26] It emerged that there arefour principal reasons for a terrorist group’s demise: police work, militaryforce, a shift to non-violent politics, or the group achieving its goals. Amove to non-violent politics had been the most common reason for a group to end(43 per cent). Only some 10 per cent of groups had effectively declaredvictory, and military force had been a critical factor in the remaining 7 percent.[27] Although the studyanalyses the major actors and factors in those instances, the military has abroader responsibility in the fight against terrorism. In 2002 at theNATO-Russia Conference the former Secretary General, Lord Robertson spoke aboutthe three main roles of the military in combating terrorism.[28] First, anti-terrorism:defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability to attack of our populations,territory, infrastructure, and information and communications systems. Second,counter-terrorism: offensive measures to track down, prevent, deter andinterdict terrorist activities. And third, consequence management: measures tolimit the consequences of terrorist attacks, and to stabilize the situation inthe aftermath of such attacks, in support of civilian authorities.On the other hand, an empirical study conducted by Cin DuBois and Caroline Buts analyses the relationship between the provision ofmilitary support and the probability of becoming the target of a terroristattack.[29] The results are quitealarming; there is a positive and significant correlation between militarydeployment and terrorist attacks. Moreover, Kuipers claims that the use ofmilitary force in tackling terrorism erodes the confidence and trust of thepeople.[30] Military reprisals thatcause the death of innocent civilians bear the risk of loss of sympathy in thejudgement of the international community. A unilateral undertaken militaryreprisal may cause strong disagreement among the members of the internationalcommunity and may not be supported by allies. Military reprisals may procedurefalse expectations among the general public of early success in conquering terrorism.The public may expect similar or intensified military action to resolve similarsituations in future. Kuipers also debate that the most appropriate methodagainst terrorism comprises the withholding of direct military confrontationand the acquisition of new weapons: gain the trust and cooperation of thegeneral population.[31] The United Kingdom Counter-Terrorism Strategy, CONTEST providesthe strategic framework for responding to terroristthreats. A newly revised version ofCONTEST highlights the use of the militarywithin several aspects of the plan.[32] Once again the usefulnessof the military intervention is perceived at the operational level. Moreover, the UK government recognizes theimportance of “Adaptability” of the armed forces as it is the core of theFuture Force 2020 vision set out in 2010.[33] The doctrine set out bythe Joint Force 2025 requires even greater adaptability by the armed forces;military personnel and capabilities reflected the Government’s ambition tocreate a military force that has the capability to deter, respond, and disruptinternational terrorist networks that pose a threat to the UK’s globalinterests and support crisis response at home and abroad.[34] As terrorism is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, effective responses to terrorism may need to take into account, and to some degree be individually configured to respond to, the evolving goals, strategies, tactics and operating environment of different terrorist groups.[35] An example of the effectiveness of the UK multipronged and multilateral military intervention is the contribution to the Global Coalition against Daesh committed to degrading and ultimately defeating Daesh. This supports the hypothesis that a military response is only useful and effective when operationally implemented rather than constituting a war model.BibliographyLoo, B. (2005) The Military and Counterterrorism. IDSCommentaries, 89/2005, available at: http://www.comw.org/tct/fulltext/0512loo.pdf, accessed 19 Jun 2016.Alexander, Yonah and Woolsey,R. James (2002) Combating TerrorismStrategies of ten countries (University of Michigan).Crenshaw, Martha (2007) The Debate over “New” vs. “Old” Terrorism (Centerfor International Security and Cooperation Stanford University), available at: http://start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/New_vs_Old_Terrorism.pdf, accessed 19 Jun 2016.Firth, Lisa (2011) International Terrorism (Cambridge:Independence Educational Publisher).LEONARD WEINBERG , AMIPEDAHZUR & SIVAN HIRSCH-HOEFLER (2004) TheChallenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence,16:4, 777-794, DOI: 10.1080/095465590899768, available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/095465590899768, accessed on 19 Jun 2018.Blake, Christopher andSheldon, Barrie and Strzelecki, Rachael and Williams, Peter (2012) Policing Terrorism Policing Matters, (London:Sage).English, Richard (2010) Terrorism how to respond, (Oxford:Oxford University Press).National SecurityStrategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (November 2015),available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf, accessedon 19 Jun 2018.Martin, Gus (2013) Understanding Terrorism – Challenges,Perspectives, Issues. 4th Edition (London: Sage).Weiss, Thomas G. and Crahan,Margaret E. and Goering John, (2004) Warson Terrorism and IRAQ (London: Routledge)Builta Jennifer A. and Heller(Sep 2011)  Reflections on 10Years CounterterrorismAnalysis (Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 3) available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-3/pdfs/Builta-Heller-CTBestPractices-Eversion-7-Oct-2011.pdf, accessed on 20 Jun 2018.Pedahzur, A. & Ranstorp,M. (2001) “A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism” in Liberal Democracies:The Case of Israel. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13(2).Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press).Pearson, Erica (2018) Operation Wrath of God ISRAELI ASSASSINATIONCAMPAIGN. Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Operation-Wrath-of-God.Ejime, Raphael (Nov 2017) Countering Modern Terrorism: Military andother Options. European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13,No.32 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e – ISSN 1857- 7431. Available at: http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Countering-Modern-Terrorism-Military-and-Other-Options.pdf. Accessed on 20 Jun 2018.Ersen, M. U?ur and Özen,Cinar (2008) Use of Force in CounteringTerrorism (Berlin: IOS Press).Seth Jones and MartinLibicki, How Terrorist Groups End:Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2008).Available at: https://rusi.org/system/files/After_The_War_On_Terror.pdf. Accessed on 21 Jun 18. NATO (09 Dec 2002) “The Role of the Military in CombatingTerrorism – Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson”,available at: https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021209b.htmaccessed on21 Jun 2018.Cind Du Bois & Caroline Buts (2014): Military support and transnational terrorism,Defence and Peace Economics, DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.972087, Availableat: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277952061_Military_support_and_transnational_terrorism Accessed on 21 Jun 2018.Kuipers, Benjamin ( 18 May2004) How to Defeat Terrorism.Available at: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/kuipers/opinions/defeating-terrorism.html. Accessed on 21 Jun 2018. CONTEST The United Kingdom’sStrategy for Countering Terrorism June 2018. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018. Accessed on 21 Jun2018.  HMGovernment, NationalSecurity Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secureand Prosperous United Kingdom, November 2015, available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/153/153.pdf Accessed on 21 Jun 2018. CRS Report for Congress (12Mar 2007) “ Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness”available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33160.pdf  accessed on 21 Jun 2018.[1] In line withthe work conducted by: B. Loo (2005).[2] Y.Alexander, R. J. Woolsey (2002).[3] M. Crenshaw(2007); see also G. Martin (2013), p.41-43.[4] L. Weinberg, A. Pedahzur, S. Hirsch-Hoefler (2004). [5] L. Firth(2011), p.2.[6] E. H. Carr(1961)[7] B. Hoffman (2006), p.83.[8]  C. Bleake, Et al (2012), p.15.[9]  R. English (2010), ch.4.[10]  National Security Strategy and StrategicDefence and Security Review 2015[11] G. Martin(2013), p.38.[12] T. G. Weiss,et al (2004), p.211.[13] L. Firth(2011), p.41.[14] J.A. Builtaand E.N. Heller (Sep 2011).[15] Pedahzur, A. & Ranstorp, M.(2001), p.5.[16] James D.Kiras (2006) Terrorism and Globalization.In J. Baylis and S. Smith (2006), p.480-497.[17] Ibid. [18] G . Martin(2013), p.432.[19]  Id. [20] G . Martin(2013), p.432.[21] “OperationWrath of God”, available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Operation-Wrath-of-God. [22] “U.S. dronestrike kills Pakistani Taliban members in Afghanistan”, NEWS, 08 March 2018,available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-drone-strike-kills-pakistani-taliban-members-afghanistan-n854761. [23] Ejime, R. (2017), p.5.[24] Ersen & Ozen (2010), p.108.[25] Id.[26] S. Jones andM. Libicki (2008), p.12.[27] Id.[28] NATO (2002) The Role of the Military in CombatingTerrorism, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021209b.htm [29] Cind Du Bois & Caroline Buts (2014)[30] B. Kuipers(2004). How to Defeat Terrorism.Available at: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/kuipers/opinions/defeating-terrorism.html[31] Id.[32] CONTEST TheUnited Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism June 2018.[33] NationalSecurity Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.[34] Ibid, p.26.[35] CRS Reportfor Congress (2007) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33160.pdfp.2.Get Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more