TransformingRehabilitation will improve the Effectiveness, Governance and Legitimacy ofOffender Management in England and WalesIntroductionThe aim of this paper is to examine Transforming Rehabilitation in terms of its effectiveness, governance and legitimacy. Starting out with an explanation of legitimacy and introducing The Carter Report 2003 and its recommendations. Moving on to explain some of the needs for a change in practice, and an insight of some of the views from probation staff themselves and perceptions of negatively withering away of staff. Importantly, there are some explanation of theory, especially regarding desistance and more recently the emergence of The Good Lives Model, as a continuation of The Risk Needs Responsivity model. The explanation regarding some of the outcomes expected by TR, and the need for modernisation. As part of TR a Fee for Service and Payment by Results are explained, with the use of charts for the reader. Managing risk is an important part of the proposed changes and a change in direction to promoting desistance. Overarching drivers legitimacy and the need to implement changeThe term governance is a very old one, but it has been revitalized recently, and has become perhaps one of the most appealing concepts in social science, meaning a new notion reformed, associated with government and public administration.  Regarding TR, this may be perceived by many detractors as a case of “new wine in old bottles” Chui and Nellis (2003). Governance has been widely used in local governance. In the case of TR, the popularity of governance may have something to do with distrust about the government.  That said, The Social Exclusion Unit posited that, recommendations from The Carter Report (2003) stated that despite recent changes that have brought the management of the services closer together, no front-line organisation ultimately owns the target for reducing re-offending. This can lead to gaps in the system, for example, there is no joint national resettlement strategy and interventions in prison are often not followed up in the community, (Social Exclusion Unit 2002). This in turn leads to reconsideration of the traditional theories of public administration. Self-confidence of traditional public administration has been destroyed and it has faced an ‘identity crisis.’ Public administration, which has been supposed to be a powerful tool for solving social problems, falls down to a serious social problem itself. As a result, many theories have been proposed as alternatives to the traditional public, Ostrom (1986).Thecase for an innovative approach to offender management is quite clear cut, asthe previous attempts have been deemed costly. It is stated that in the UK morethan £3bn is spent every year on prisons, and almost £1bn annually ondelivering sentences in the community, MOJ (2013). Despite this, overallreoffending rates have barely changed over the last decade and the same faces areseemingly reappearing back through the system. Almost half of all offendersreleased from custody in 2010 reoffended within a year. Over 6000 offenderssentenced to short custodial sentences of less than 12 months in the year toJune 2012 had previously received more than 10 community sentences, yet gaps inthe sentencing framework mean very little can be done to prevent them fromreturning to crime once they are released back into the community MOJ, (2013). In 2014, under the TransformingRehabilitation (TR) changes MOJ, (2013), and Probation Trusts were split intothe National Probation Service (NPS) which became part of the civil service and21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) which were subject tomarketisation and a commercial tendering process, as seen inFig.1. with their Contract Package Areas (CPA).  After the bidding process was completed in2014, eleven CRCs were owned by private sector companies leading a partnershipwith third sector organisations, three were joint ventures between the private,public, and third sector, three were a public, private, and third sectorpartnership; two were owned by the private sector exclusively; and another twowere equity joint ventures between the private and third sectors (Deering andFeilzer 2015, p.13). Fig.1. CPA Map showing the 21 Contract Package Areas On 29 October 2014, the MoJ announced its preferredbidders to run the Community Rehabilitation Companies in these areas. Here arethe successful bidders and as seen in Fig.2.Sodexo and NACRO have been successful in six CRCsInterserve who are leading partnerships in five CRCsMTCNovo, a Joint Venture between MTC and a number of other organisations, have won London and Thames Valley.Working Links are the preferred bidders in three CRCs.The Reducing Reoffending Partnership  is a Joint Venture between Ingeus, St Giles Trust and CRI, who will run the two large Midlands CRCs , being Staffs & West Midlands and Derby, Leicester, Nottinghamshire & Rutland). Webster (2017) Fig.2. Showing winning bidders in the Contract Package Areas Clearly the changes imposed because of TR have had the potentia to affect all three types of legitimacy, but perhaps particularly more so upon self- legitimacy. (Robinson, Burke and Millings , 2016)Around 50% of all crime is committed by individuals who have already known by criminal justice system (CJS). The cost to the taxpayer of reoffending is estimated to be £9.5 to £13 billion per year. There has been little positive change in reconviction rates and almost half of those released from prison go on to reoffend within 12 months. The need to reduce reoffending to reduce both the number of victims and the costs to the taxpayer. To achieve this, there is a need to adopt a tough but intelligent criminal justice system that punishes people properly when they break the law, but also supports them so they don’t commit crime in the future. (MOJ, 2015)Othersare more guarded in the way they anticipate the future of TR, and Canton (2011)in particular, stresses the importance of what the probation service continuesto represent and its values, such as belief in the possibility of change andsocial inclusion. McNeill (2011) characterises probation as a justice agency,with key roles in advocating for probationers in relation to access to socialgoods that have been denied and mediating between law breakers, theircommunities and social institutions. Thisideal view contrasts with the reality of delivering community sanctions in atough penal climate dominated by public protection, which is one of Liz Truss’skey priorities, with a reduction of violence to staff currently running at 40%and a spotlight on education as the 3rd priority, especially Englishand Maths, MOJ (2017). McNeill also argues that it is critical for the long-termlegitimacy and credibility of probation. At this point in time, it may be uncertainas to whether a doom-ridden or a phoenix-rising vision of the probation futureis more likely to come about, although some truths may be gathered fromempirical evidence gathered from probation officers and trainees. There seems to be a great deal of optimism onone side of the camp for TR, as to how the recent changes will be implemented,but on the other side, a great deal of pessimism regarding the implementationof TR. NAPO (National Association of Probation Officers) and UNISON, (PublicSector Trade Union), collectively had made their feelings known. They both statedthat a large majority of the 17,000 probation staff refer to TR as a “catalogueof errors” in terms of staff assignment, a mismatch between workload, staffinglevels and staff location, compromised risk management, reduced IT capabilitywith NOMS, nDelius case management system, although C-NOMIS already hadinherent problems as seen in fig.3. Increased bureaucracy and a huge rise inthe use of temporary and sessional staff were deemed to be the main problems.High performing Probation Trusts have been replaced with poorly performing replacements.(NAPO and UNISON, 2017). The probation staff were quick to point out that theywere not to blame for the errors. Regarding the use of temporary and sessionalstaff will aid the ability to be dynamic and cope with peaks and troughs. Theuse of the voluntary sector with CRC’s may also be a sticking point withregular probation staff, although as stated by John Podmore, professor ofapplied social sciences, “NOMS was never an organisation that its employeesproudly declared they belonged to.Creating a National Prison and Probation Service that people aspire to join and importantly to stay in and develop skills and careers is a crucial step forward. But it must be much more than just name change”, Podmore (2017). Lizz Truss, current Minister of Justice as of April 2017, was keen to promote the newly created Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service with the following  bold statement, “The creation of HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), will build a world-leading, specialist agency, dedicated to professionalising the prison and probation workforce, backed by an additional £100m a year and 2,500 additional prison officers, with a £1.3 bn budget to build new prisons, whilst at the same time closing old and inefficient prisons”, Truss (2017).  Scepticism may be in the forefronts of most ofthe staff affected by the new era dawning, as previous ministers, namely MrGove and Mr Grayling had somewhat seemed to have  failed in their primary objectives for areformed and efficient joined up agency. Fig.3.Assesemnt of C-NOMIS National Audit Office 2009 The Need for ChangeAccountsof the origins of probation and its realisation in organisational form give differentemphases to its role in social justice, redemption, and control or separationof ‘suspect populations’ from respectable society (Vanstone, 2004). The historyof the service has frequently been described in terms of ‘phases’, one notableexample suggesting that it moved from the missionary phase through welfare anddiversion from custody phases towards more recent orientations towardspunishment in the community and then public protection (Chui and Nellis, 2003).The reality of practice is less straightforward, although changes in social andpolitical norms certainly mean that the problem of offending, and, inevitably,law-breakers becomes enclosed by practitioners in different terms. Redeemable,treatable or unmanageable, safe or risky, motivated or unmotivated, (Canton,2011: 29). With current reference to offendermanagement stated that ,  ratherthan probation supervisionasthe dominant way of describing the work of the probation service is a case inpoint. To what extent does this represent a real shift towards a technocraticand business-like approach? Or does the term seek to mask the essentialcontinuity in both human interactions between probation officers andprobationers, and the normalising function benevolent or otherwise ofprobation? Thesequestions are certainly not settled. Yet, in the face of the Transforming Rehabilitationreforms(MoJ, 2013a: MoJ, 2013b), they become highly significant when we consider thepractices and values that might transfer out of the probation service into thenew Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) ,as staff move from one to theother. They are also relevant in anticipating what motivations and values mightguide this new version of the NPS, tightly focused on work with higher riskoffenders and in the courts to assist sentencing and enforcement procedures.From a critical perspective, Cavadino et.al.(2013: 134) fear the ‘withering away’ of supervisionof probationers and even question the TransformingRehabilitation, or transforming the occupational identity of probation workers?Theory (Desistance)As far back as the 1800’s, the French social scientist, Quetelet (1833), argued that the penchant for crime diminishes with age because of what was described as the “enfeeblement of physical vitality”. Given that one of the aims of the Criminal Justice System is to reduce crime, then does Transforming Rehabilitation support this? Desistance is one of the mechanisms that can aid TR, however desistance is a complicated process of many twist and turns on that journey to desist from offending. Transforming Rehabilitation is now well under way and reports on its success will be under much scrutiny in the coming months ahead. Desistance from crime, is described as the long-term abstinence from criminal behaviour among those for whom offending had become a pattern of behaviour, is something of a mystery. Producing or encouraging desistance is the implicit focus of much criminal justice policy, practice and research. It is one of the key outcomes that justice interventions are designed to achieve and much research treats reducing or ending offending as a key measure of effectiveness, McNeill et. al. (2012).Oneof the few near eventualities in criminal justice is that for many individuals,offending behaviour peaks in their teenage years, and then starts to decline.This pattern is represented in what is known as the ‘age crime curve’. The agecrime curve is of a symmetrical bell shaped curve that shows the prevalence’sof offending, that peaks between the ages of 15 – 19 and declines in the 20’s,Farrington (1986). Studies of desistance illuminate the processes of changeassociated with the age-crime curve (Kazemian, 2007). If we are to understanddesistance from crime, particularly how and why crime tails off over time, weneed both testable theories of this process and empirical evidence. There is asignificant evidence base on the causes of crime but desistance researchsuggests that the factors behind the onset of offending are often different thanthe factors behind its abandonment. Understanding desistance also has moresubtle impacts on criminal justice debates.Themost current version of The Good Lives Model, incorporates desistance theoryand also elements of positive psychology Laws and Ward (2011), is strengthbased regarding the premise that humans are by nature, practical decisionmakers, who invariably adapt themselves to their environment. In relation todesistance, Maruna (2001), described what he coined the Pygmalion effect,stated that the elevated expectations of others will lead to a greater self-belief,aiding the process of ‘knifing off’, or cutting off bonds with their criminalpast. In order to achieve these goals, a great deal of emphasis on social capitalor opportunities and human capital or motivations and capacities, McNeill(2006) are necessary elements to aid primary and secondary desistance. Withrespect to the GLM as to its effectiveness, research into this model is rather ambivalentand rather scarce to date to be able to measure the evidence.Offender Management OutcomesKirton and Guillame (2015), argue that stafffeel that TR has deprofessionalized the service and that stress levels are high, due to higherworkloads, job insecurity, less autonomy and reduced opportunities for trainingand progression. Many respondents in their study were considering leaving theservice. Moreover, responses to theMinistry of Justice’s (2016) Civil Service PeopleSurveyfor the NPS suggestthat only a minority of NPS staff feel that they are involved in decisions thataffect their work (38%); that poor performance is dealt with effectively intheir team (35%); that there are learning and development opportunities (42%);and that there are career opportunities in the NPS (33%).TheNOMS Offender Management Model is the product of bringing together the policyrequirements and the messages from research and other evidence, and definingwhat these together mean for the principles of how NOMS will go about managingindividual offenders. It is the bridge between the broad brush strokes ofpolicy, and the finer detail of practice. It forms part of NOMS’ commissioningframework, setting out the broad specification for the approach it expects thosemanaging individual offenders to deploy, and acting as the basis for thedevelopment of Standards and performance measures, NOMS (2006). Post Carterreport, this was simply a reply from this by concentrating on key themes likemodernisation in the form of New Public Management (NPM), trying to control theincreasing population in the prison system and by trying to find solutions tothe lack of communication between services under the umbrella of probationsupervision and prison and probation.Payment by ResultsFig.4. Key Components of Fee For Service Mechanism  The MOJ sets out the mechanisms of FFS: Fee ForService (FFS) is payment for mandated activities that deliver through the gateservices, (TTG), the sentence of the court and licence conditions to time andquality. A recognition that volume risk, that is the risk that providers arerequired to deliver services for a larger or smaller number of offenders thanexpected has been raised as a serious concern, and therefore the risk needs tobe shared between Government and providers. The FFS component will therefore bea fixed price for services with a volume related adjustment where changes tovolume levels fall outside of an appropriately determined tolerance range, asseen in FIig.4. above. This volume tolerance range recognises that the likelyreason for a significantincrease ordecrease in volume is most likely to be due to external factors not within thecontrol of a provider.Paymentby Results’ (PbR) seems to be an ideal mechanism in TR, particularly in thecurrent economic climate and under a government which is so keen, to reducepublic expenditure, but also to reduce the scale of the public sector, andinnovative because possible failings may allow to transfer the costs to privatecompanies involved.  Fox and Albertson(2011) stated, there are other potential benefits to PbR. The sheer possibilityof making profits is expected to bring new providers into the field. This,combined with a financial incentive to achieve outcomes, is then expected toincrease competition, sweep away unnecessary bureaucracy, and increase thedesire to innovate. leading to a better understanding of what is effective, possiblyleading to lower unit costs thus allowing for an element of profit to be paid.This is expected to facilitate the involvement of smaller providers who may nothave the financial resources to sustain a service over several years whilewaiting for their results to be evident and their payments to be triggered. Inall, if implemented properly then a huge success for private companies involvedin TR. Fig.5.Illustration of payment curve incorporating stretch targets. Managing RiskOne also must bear in mind that the priority given todifferent purposes is likely to vary over time. Countries can change theirpenal philosophies, with different purposes and emphases being put on the roleof probation within criminal justice. Kemshall (2010) and others, for example,have argued that, in the last decade or so, more emphasis has been placed onpublic protection and minimizing risk in England and Wales, with a linkedpriority on enforcement of breach. The government’s new consultation document,‘Breaking the cycle: effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing ofoffenders’ may see a swing back towards rehabilitation and promotingdesistance, whilst promoting community sentences for less serious offences andwithout compromising public protection (Ministry of Justice 2010). Fig.6.Prochaska and DiClemente’s Cycle of Change Model ConclusionLessonsfrom the Thatcher government (1979–1990) taught us that her government targetedthe large public sector organisations involved in the provision of utilitieswhom they presented as being inefficient, over-bureaucratic and unresponsivebecause they were not subjected to the ‘discipline’ of the market, such as theprison service. However, there was also the realisation that selling thosepublic entities, who were profitable by virtue of their monopoly position,afforded a short-term opportunity to raise revenues, lower taxation and reducepublic sector borrowing, now seen again in a Conservative government, Annisonet.al. (2014). Do we state the obvious or is it a case of Deja vou? In thisrespect, it is worth remembering that earlier initiatives introduced by theprevious Labour government to address this issue – such as the NOMS and CustodyPlus3 were subsequently abandoned on the grounds of the costs involved.Atthe heart of the government’s TR rhetoric is the idea of innovation, however asin some cases a phone call every 6 weeks from a CRC to a low risk offender maynot be seen this way. TR has been communicated from the top down as anopportunity for providers of probation services to liberate themselves fromcentral control and develop creative, effective solutions to the problem ofreoffending (Ministry of Justice 2013a; 2013b). Thequestion of perceptual legitimacy, internal, external, and self- legitimacy hasbecome a core site of debate for probation. Bradford and Quinton’s (2014)conditions for self-legitimacy, namely levels of attachment to the new organizations,the internalization of organizational goals, a sense of being supported by the organization,and a belief that probation staff in both the CRCs and the NPS remainlegitimate holders of authority.As David Cameron once remarkedwhilst Prime Minister, ‘finding diamonds in the rough and letting them shine’.With effective rehabilitation methods in place and joined up workingprinciples, maybe optimistically, we just might see many shining lights, andhail the implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation. 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Breaking the cycle: effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencingof offenders.  London: Ministry ofJustice.Ministry of Justice (2013a) TransformingRehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform London: MoJ.Ministry of Justice (2013b) TransformingRehabilitation: Target operating model, rehabilitation programme London:MoJ.Ministry of Justice (2016) Civil Service People Survey 2016:  The National Probation Service.https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573656/nps-people-survery-results-2016.pdf (accessed 26 April 2016).National Audit Office (2002), Reducing Prisoner Reoffending.Ostrom,E. (1986). An Agenda for the Study of Institutions. Public Choice. 48(1): 3-25.Podmore,J., (2017). http://thejusticegap.com/2017/02/farewell-noms-need-name-change/.Website [accessed 24 April 2017]. SocialExclusion Unit (2002). Reducing Re-offending by ex -Prisoners.Vanstone,M. (2004) Supervising offenders in the community: A history of probationtheory and practice Aldershot: Ashgate.BibliographyFig.1. CPA Map showing the 21 Contract Package AreasFig2. System GovernanceFig.3.Assesemnt of C-NOMIS National Audit Office 2009Fig.4. Key Components of Fee for Service MechanismFig.5.Illustration of payment curve incorporatingstretch targets.Fig.6.Prochaska and DiClemente’s Cycle of Change ModelGet Help With Your EssayIf you need assistance with writing your essay, our professional essay writing service is here to help!Find out more